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Abstract 
Purpose – This research examines the effects of organizational tactics (e.g., explanation and 
monetary compensation) on customers’ reactions to service termination. The mediating role 
of anger and the moderating role of termination strategy on the effectiveness of 
organizational tactics are examined to enhance our understanding of customers’ reactions to 
service termination.  
Design/methodology/approach – Three experimental studies are conducted with different 
contexts (telecom, banking) and samples (students, consumers).  
Findings – Study 1 results show that explanation and high monetary compensation reduce 
negative word of mouth (nWOM) and enhance corporate image and anger mediates these 
effects. Study 2a results show that high monetary compensation becomes ineffective when 
firms use a soft termination approach. Study 2b results show that an explanation is equally 
effective in soft and hard termination approaches. Importantly, unlike high monetary 
compensation, explanation can fully eliminate the negative consequences of service 
termination. 
Practical implications – Managers can mitigate negative customers’ reactions to service 
termination by offering a truthful explanation. Further, they should provide high monetary 
compensation only if they do not help dismissed customers find an alternative provider. 
Originality/value – This paper contributes to the service termination literature by shedding 
more light on the effectiveness of different organizational tactics following different 
termination strategies. The findings challenge existing wisdom on the overrated role of 
monetary compensation showing that in service termination, explanation is the most effective 
remedy. Further, unlike justice, anger fully explains customers’ reactions to service 
termination. 
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Customers’ Reactions to Different Organizational Tactics in a Service 
Termination Context 
 
Introduction 
Stories about unilateral termination of customer relationships have received considerable 
media coverage indicating it is a pressing phenomenon1. For example, a customer received a 
letter from his bank stating "We are sorry that we cannot continue our relationship with you." 
The letter filled the man with rage as he had remained loyal to his bank for 45 years and then, 
they dumped him in an ice-cold way (Freiberger, 2017). 
Although firm-initiated service termination resembles a service failure in that both 
cause inconvenience to customers (Mattila, 2001), these differ in two important ways. First, a 
firm-initiated service termination often represents a strategic move (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2009), 
which can affect many customers, and hence cause strong negative reactions (Albrecht, Walsh, 
& Beatty, 2016). Second, service termination, which is a form of selective de-marketing (Kotler 
& Levy, 1971), is a deliberate act. Unlike typical service failures such as flight delays or 
overcooked meals, which are not intentional, terminating customer relationships results from a 
thought-out process. These intentional transgressions may be less frequent, but are more 
damaging than unintentional ones (Varela-Neira, Vázquez-Casielles, & Iglesias, 2014).  
                                                          
1 For a list of selected termination cases, see Table A 1. in the Online Appendix 
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In light of these two differences, negative customers’ reactions to firm-initiated service 
termination are likely to be stronger. In particular, affected customers often feel angry (Mittal, 
Sarkees, & Murshed, 2008) and tend to retaliate, for example through negative word-of-mouth 
(nWOM) (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2010; Lepthien, Papies, Clement, & Melnyk, 2017). As a typical 
revenge-seeking behavior (Grégoire, Laufer, & Tripp, 2010), nWOM can cause further 
problems to firms. This is particularly true at an age where, thanks to social media, such 
reactions can become viral and cause public uproar (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2012). Service 
termination can also damage firms' image (Alajoutsijärvi, Möller, & Tähtinen, 2000) and 
impose significant indirect costs such as the loss of other existing customers and the negative 
impact on future acquisition (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2010). Interestingly, the negative reactions 
of other existing customers towards termination is also quite high, irrespective of the tie 
strength with the affected customers (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2012).   
Given these detrimental effects, it is important that firms reduce customers' anger and 
nWOM and restore their image through appropriate organizational tactics. In our introductory 
example, the bank only felt "sorry" for terminating the old man's account. In other cases, Amex 
offered customers $300 (Fournier, Breazeale, & Fetscherin, 2012), whereas TCF bank closed 
customers’ accounts without any compensation or explanation (Dave, 2014).  
Academic research on effectiveness of organizational tactics on customers’ reactions 
to service termination is limited. Among a few studies, Lepthien et al. (2017) found that high 
monetary compensation or offering a downgrade as an alternative to termination can reduce 
customers’ negative reactions. Further, Haenlein and Kaplan (2010) investigated the 
effectiveness of offering products with a better value (i.e., better quality or lower prices) to 
improve the firm's image among other customers. However, this was only effective among 
other existing customers, but not among prospective customers, indicating that termination can 
significantly hurt future acquisition.  
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Yet, three important issues remain unexplored. First, the effectiveness of psychological 
compensation, which is considered a salient remedy in prior research on firms' transgressions 
(Davidow, 2003; Roschk & Gelbrich, 2014), has not been examined in a service termination 
context yet. As psychological compensation, we argue that an explanation, rather than an 
apology, is necessary. This is because customers need to understand why firms deliberately 
take such a hostile action.  
Second, there is a lack of research on examining the interplay between different 
organizational tactics, such as monetary compensation or explanation, and different 
termination strategies (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000). Specifically, Grewal, Roggeveen, and Tsiros 
(2008) call for research on the boundary conditions for the effectiveness of compensation. It is 
conceivable that a soft termination (i.e., offering to move customers to another provider) as 
opposed to a hard termination (i.e., terminating the relationship without offering an alternative 
provider) strategy may render specific organizational tactics unnecessary.  
Third, there is a lack of research on customers’ emotional reactions to termination 
(Haenlein & Kaplan, 2012). Lepthien et al. (2017) present injustice or unfairness as a cognitive 
mediator, defined as the perception that service termination contradicts the treatment customers 
are entitled to, yielding negative customer behavior. Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory, 
which claims that people evaluate an event based on several dimensions, including desirability 
and agency (comprising self vs. other agency, controllability and intentionality) (Watson & 
Spence, 2007; Weber, 2004), we argue that a firm-initiated service termination is an 
undesirable and intentional act caused and controlled by the firm and thus, tends to trigger 
strong emotional reactions like anger (Mittal et al., 2008). In support, Nguyen and McColl-
Kennedy (2003) argue that an unfair treatment, being an undesirable event, may elicit negative 
emotional reactions, ranging from less intense emotions such as dissatisfaction (Bougie, 
Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2003) to more intense emotions such as anger (Mikula, Scherer, & 
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Athenstaedt, 1998). Accordingly, injustice perception may precede anger following a 
transgression, but anger is only provoked when a firm is perceived as responsible and causing 
the harm on purpose (De Cremer, Wubben, & Brebels, 2008). Prior research shows that when 
anger is elicited, it can fully mediate the effect of (in)justice on misbehavior (Beijersbergen, 
Dirkzwager, Eichelsheim, Van der Laan, & Nieuwbeerta, 2015; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Given 
that anger, as a specific attribution-dependent emotion that fosters customer revenge and 
nWOM (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007), taps into a more refined cognitive process of blaming 
a transgressor (Nguyen & McColl-Kennedy, 2003; Watson & Spence, 2007), it may ultimately 
drive customers’ reactions to severe and intentional firm transgressions such as service 
termination. 
In sum, we aim to answer three questions: 1. How effective are different organizational 
tactics in reducing customers’ negative reactions to service termination? 2. Does service 
termination strategy moderate the effects of these organizational tactics?  3. Does anger rather 
than justice fully explain these relationships? Answering these questions makes three 
contributions to the service termination literature.  
First, we examine the remedial effect of monetary compensation and its boundary 
condition on customer nWOM and image perceptions after service termination. Building on 
Lepthien et al. (2017), we present high monetary compensation (as a seemingly powerful 
organizational tactic) in a different light and show that service termination strategy moderates 
its effect. Specifically, while high monetary compensation is effective with a hard termination, 
it can be rendered unnecessary with a soft termination approach. Second, we show that 
explanation (first time examined in a service termination context) is more powerful than money 
(at least with respect to nWOM) and its effect is robust, that is, independent of the termination 
strategy. This is important because explanation is a cost-free alternative to monetary 
compensation. Further, apology, does not help with an intentional act like customer dismissal. 
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Third, we show that anger (as a specific attribution dependent emotion) is decisive for assessing 
the effectiveness of organizational tactics on customers’ reactions to service termination, while 
justice no longer plays a key role. These findings provide managers with critical insights on 
how to handle service termination in a way that minimizes the negative consequences for the 
focal firm. Given that reducing anger is the key to minimizing negative customers’ reactions, 
our recommendations center around mitigating perceived firm-agency of the termination act. 
This effect can be best achieved by providing a truthful explanation for dismissing customers, 
regardless of the chosen termination strategy. Another way to reduce anger is offering to move 
customers to alternative providers. This soft termination approach offers a way to avoid high 
investment into monetary recompense, which, otherwise, may be necessary with a hard 
termination approach.  
 
Theoretical foundations 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory 
Our theoretical framework is based on cognitive appraisal theory (Ortony & Clore, 1988), 
which offers a deeper understanding of how emotions occur. The theory predicts what emotions 
are provoked following an event and how these emotions influence behavioral responses 
(Watson & Spence, 2007). The first core proposition is that people evaluate a situation on 
different appraisal dimensions. The primary dimension is outcome desirability, which refers to 
whether the outcome of a situation is desirable (positive) or undesirable (negative). As such, it 
determines the valence of an emotion (Ruth, Brunel, & Otnes, 2002). The next important 
appraisal dimension is agency (Ortony & Clore, 1988), which is derived from causal attribution 
theory (Watson & Spence, 2007), and includes the agent (i.e., internal vs. external), perceived 
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control (i.e., controllable vs. uncontrollable) and intentionality2 (i.e., intentional vs. 
unintentional). Agency can be attributed to oneself (i.e., internal) which can lead to guilt, to 
others (i.e., external) which can cause anger, or to a circumstance which can result in 
frustration, but only the first two are perceived to be controllable (Watson & Spence, 2007). 
As such, anger can be defined as an emotion that occurs when an intentional event with an 
undesirable outcome is attributed to someone else as responsible for the problem (De Cremer 
et al., 2008).  
The second core proposition of appraisal theory is that specific emotions tend to trigger 
certain behavioral reactions (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989). Angry people, for example, 
often try to attack the person responsible for a harmful situation (Lazarus, 1991). We transfer 
these notions to service termination, which represents a "violation of implicitly assumed social 
norms" (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2011, p. 85). It is a deliberate firm action with negative 
consequences for the customers who may feel denigrated and have to find an alternative 
provider (Mittal et al., 2008). As such, an undesirable and deliberate act caused by the firm, 
induces anger and negative customers’ reactions such as nWOM (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2012) 
and image loss (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000). 
Hence, organizational tactics aimed to mitigate these customers’ reactions have to 
reduce the preceding anger. Here, appraisal theory suggests that the firm could seek to 
influence customer appraisal on the two dimensions comprised in anger. Specifically, they 
could reduce the outcome undesirability (by mitigating the negative consequences of service 
termination) or firm-agency (by reducing perceptions that the firm is responsible for service 
termination and intends to harm the customer).  
                                                          
2 While controllability and intentionality are sometimes used interchangeably, these two are distinct constructs which can 
determine whether a harm is done on purpose or due to negligence (e.g., see Varela-Neira et al., 2014). 
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In the following, we will build on this idea when hypothesizing the effectiveness of the 
different organizational tactics monetary compensation and explanation in service 
termination. In our conceptual framework, presented in Figure 1, we propose that high, but not 
low, monetary compensation (H1) and explanation (H2) mitigate anger, reducing nWOM (a) 
and fostering firm image (b). Further, we propose that service termination strategy (hard vs. 
soft termination) moderates the effects of high monetary compensation (H3) and explanation 
(H4) on nWOM (a) and image (b).  
Figure 1 to be inserted here 
 
Hypotheses on the effects of organizational tactics 
Monetary compensation. Monetary compensation consists of financial remuneration such as 
refund or cash-equivalent offered to customers who encounter a service problem (Bambauer-
Sachse & Rabeson, 2015). The remedial effect of monetary compensation for service failures 
is well-established, resulting in reduced anger (Chebat, Davidow, & Codjovi, 2005; Walster, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1973) and nWOM (Coombs & Holladay, 2008) as well as enhancing 
corporate image (Benoit & Drew, 1997).  
In a service termination context, we argue that dismissed customers need to invest time 
and effort, which is considered an economic loss (Bagozzi, 1975). Based on cognitive appraisal 
theory, monetary compensation should be an appropriate tactic as it can reduce the 
undesirability of the outcome. This is because following a negative incident that is caused by 
someone else, customers feel angry and seek redress (Nguyen & McColl-Kennedy, 2003). 
Hence, offering monetary compensation for the inconveniences caused by service termination 
can reduce the undesirability of the outcome (i.e., the negative valence), reducing anger 
(Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005) and subsequent negative reactions.  
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Prior research supports that the amount of monetary compensation should be consistent 
with the intensity of the negative encounter (Smith, Bolton, & Wagner, 1999), because a 
mismatch can even increase anger (Walster et al., 1973). This means for a minor problem, low 
compensation is required and for a severe problem, high compensation is needed. Indeed, 
Bambauer-Sachse and Rabeson (2015) find that higher monetary compensation is more 
effective in more severe service problems, which is consistent with Balaji and Sarkar (2013)'s 
suggestion that compensation strategy should be designed according to the magnitude of 
problem. Accordingly, in case of service terminationwhich is a severe problemhigh 
monetary compensation would be needed to diffuse customers' anger and their subsequent 
negative reactions.  
Lepthien et al. (2017) provide initial support for our arguments, showing that only 
substantial (but not small) compensation amounts decrease dismissed customers' unfairness 
perceptions. They also suggest, but do not test, that high monetary compensation can reduce 
customers' negative emotions. Accordingly, we consider offering no compensation as a 
baseline and hypothesize that high, but not low monetary compensation can reduce the 
undesirability of the termination, resulting in lower nWOM and higher firm image perception, 
and these relationships are mediated by anger. Formally: 
H1a: High monetary compensation decreases nWOM following service termination, mediated 
by anger. 
H1b: High monetary compensation increases corporate image following service termination, 
mediated by anger. 
 
Explanation. Explanation means to provide "the reason for, or the cause of, some event that is 
not immediately obvious or entirely known" (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003, p. 445). In the 
context at hand, it means informing customers why they were dismissed. Prior research 
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indicates that an explanation is only effective if it is perceived as truthful and reasonable 
(Colquitt, 2001). Offering an appropriate explanation to customers at times of negative service 
encounters can reduce customers' anger and nWOM (Gelbrich, 2010), while lack of an 
appropriate explanation can make customers angry (Wang & Mattila, 2011).  
Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory, an explanation can shed light on the causal 
attribution dimension and help customers re-assess the perceived agency for the service 
termination. According to Nguyen and McColl-Kennedy (2003), displacing the responsibility 
away from the provider mitigates customers' anger. For example, in a termination context, 
offering an explanation can reduce firm-agency by informing customers that they are partly 
responsible, for instance due to excessive complaint (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2012) or lack of 
profitability (Mittal et al., 2008). In diverting the blame away from the firm, customers may 
feel less angry, which in turn, tends to reduce their negative reactions to the firm's 
transgressions (Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005; Gelbrich, 2010). Formally, we hypothesize that, 
compared to no explanation: 
H2a: Explanation decreases nWOM following service termination, mediated by anger. 
H2b: Explanation increases corporate image following service termination, mediated by anger. 
 
Another organizational tactic, which effectively mitigates anger after firms' 
transgressions, is apology (Nguyen & McColl-Kennedy, 2003). This is because an apology 
comprises expressions of remorse and thus, acknowledges blame for the negative event 
(Roschk & Kaiser, 2013). Yet, deliberately closing a customer's account andat the same 
timeapologizing for this action could be perceived as insincere. Given that perceived 
sincerity is a precondition for an apology to be effective (Roschk & Kaiser, 2013), we expect 
a null effect of apology tactic in a service termination context. 
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Hypotheses on moderating effects of termination strategy 
Firms can use a hard approach or a soft approach to terminate customer relationships (Haenlein, 
Kaplan, & Schoder, 2006). In the hard approach, firms focus on short-term self-interest by 
explicitly telling customers the relationship has come to an end with no opportunity for 
negotiation (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000). In the soft approach, firms wish to end the relationship 
amicably by offering to move customers to another provider (Mittal et al., 2008).  
Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory, hard termination should be perceived as more 
undesirable because customers would have to invest time and effort to find an alternative 
provider. Further, uncertainty about the future can reinforce negative emotions (Watson & 
Spence, 2007). Here, not knowing whether other companies can provide the required service 
or how long it will take to resume the service are unknowns that can create uncertainty. This 
uncertainty may increase the undesirability of a hard termination approach and result in higher 
anger. Grégoire et al. (2010) support this notion that a more severe problem can reinforce anger. 
Hence, a higher redress may be needed to reduce these high anger levels. Indeed, Smith 
et al. (1999) show that compensation is more effective in a severe problem compared with a 
minor problem. Roggeveen, Tsiros, and Grewal (2012) also report that offering compensation 
will lead to more favorable responses after a severe (vs. minor) problem. Likewise, Van 
Vaerenbergh, Larivière, and Vermeir (2012) show that customers who experience negative 
encounters with greater magnitude are likely to react more favorably toward organizational 
compensation tactics. Therefore, offering high monetary compensation is necessary following 
a hard termination approach. 
Following a soft termination, the customer still has the option to be transferred to 
another provider without any hassle (Mittal et al., 2008) and hence can avoid service disruption. 
Similarly, Lepthien et al. (2017) suggest that offering an alternative service rather than 
termination may reduce negative emotions. Accordingly, a soft termination strategy can be 
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perceived as a less undesirable outcome, which can lead to lower anger and negative customers’ 
reactions. Therefore, high monetary compensation is not necessary following soft termination. 
Formally, we hypothesize that the anger-reducing effects of high monetary compensation are 
stronger for a hard (vs. soft) termination approach: 
H3a: The mediating effect of high monetary compensation on nWOM through anger is 
moderated by termination strategy, such that the effect is more pronounced for a hard 
(vs. soft) termination strategy.  
H3b: The mediating effect of high monetary compensation on corporate image through anger 
is moderated by termination strategy, such that the effect is more pronounced for a hard 
(vs. soft) termination strategy. 
 
We also propose an anger-reducing effect when combining an explanation with a hard 
termination approach, but this effect may work through decreasing firm-agency. Firms 
adopting a hard termination approach focus on self-interest and lack concern for the customers 
(Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000). This can further reinforce customers' evaluations that the firm is 
responsible for this problem, increasing anger and negative reactions. Offering an explanation 
may enable customers to see the problem from the firm’s perspective and re-evaluate their 
blame attribution, which can subsequently reduce anger after a hard termination. Indeed, prior 
research supports that firms which successfully shift the blame away from themselves through 
explanation can diffuse customers’ anger (Nguyen & McColl-Kennedy, 2003).  
In contrast, following a soft termination approach, the firm takes responsibility by 
showing the willingness to go the extra mile to help the customer with a smoother transition 
(Mittal et al., 2008). Therefore, the perceived firm-agency may be weaker. Based on cognitive 
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appraisal theory, this can lead to lower anger and negative reactions and hence, offering an 
explanation would not be necessary. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4a: The mediating effect of explanation on nWOM through anger is moderated by termination 
strategy, such that the effect is more pronounced for a hard (vs. soft) termination strategy. 
H4b: The mediating effect of explanation on corporate image through anger is moderated by 
termination strategy, such that the effect is more pronounced for a hard (vs. soft) 
termination strategy. 
 
Overview of studies 
Three experimental studies examine the effects of different organizational tactics on customers’ 
reactions to service termination, the process at work, and potential boundary conditions. Study 
1 draws on a telecom setting and a student sample. It tests the effects of monetary compensation 
(H1a, b) and explanation (H2a, b) on nWOM and corporate image, through the mediating role 
of anger. The two subsequent studies test whether service termination strategy moderates the 
processes "organizational tactic  anger  nWOM, image." Study 2a focuses on monetary 
compensation (H3a, b) and Study 2b focuses on explanation (H4a, b).  
 
Study 1  
Purpose  
Study 1 tests whether high (but not low) monetary compensation (H1) and explanation (H2) 
decrease nWOM (a) and increase corporate image (b), mediated by anger. Though not 
specifically hypothesized, we also test the proposed null-effect of apology.  
 
Design and data collection  
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We conducted a scenario-based, single factor experiment, manipulating organizational tactics 
with five conditions (low monetary compensation, high monetary compensation, explanation, 
apology, and a control group with no compensation) (see Online Appendix A 3. for the 
scenarios). We chose home broadband services, which was deemed appropriate for 
undergraduate students recruited from a business school in Western Europe. They were invited 
to complete a pen and paper questionnaire in exchange for charity donations. Excluding 
incomplete answers (n = 5) yielded 114 respondents (female: 57%; younger than 24 years: 
97.4%). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five scenarios. 
 
Manipulations 
The core scenario describes a letter from a broadband provider communicating that following 
a recent review of the account, the company has decided to withdraw its services and is giving 
30 days' notice to terminate the account. Next, the customer contacts the customer service to 
complain and is or is not offered monetary compensation, an explanation, or an apology. In a 
pretest with university students (n=38), the average amount of monetary compensation 
expected following termination of their broadband account was £100. We added/subtracted an 
equal amount (£50) to determine our high (£150) and low (£50) compensation. The success of 
this manipulation was checked in the main study (see below). 
 
Measures 
After reading the scenario, participants answered questions on nWOM adapted from Bougie, 
Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2003) (α = .97), corporate image adapted from Mostafa et al. (2015) 
(α = .98), and anger taken from Grégoire and Fisher (2008) and Bougie et al. (2003) (α = .97), 
all measured with three items (see Table A 2. in the Online Appendix). As control variables, 
attitude towards complaining (ATC) was measured according to Roschk and Gelbrich (2014) 
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(three items; α = .86), attributions based on Gelbrich, Gäthke, and Grégoire (2015) (three items; 
α = .74) and perceived severity (three items, α = .92) and service importance (1 item) based on 
Hess, Ganesan, and Klein (2003). This is because these variables are shown to influence 
customers’ reactions to firms' transgressions in previous research (Grégoire et al., 2010; Hess 
et al., 2003). Seven-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree) were used, 
except for service importance and perceived severity (seven-point bipolar scales). We also 
added gender as a demographic control.  
 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Three nominal attention checks were used, testing if respondents 
understood that they received monetary compensation (None/£50/£150), an explanation 
(yes/no), and an apology (yes/no). Twenty respondents provided incorrect answers. They were 
excluded from further analysis (Albrecht et al., 2016), yielding a net sample size of n = 94. The 
success of the manipulations was checked using 7-point Likert scales (Mostafa, Lages, Shabbir, 
& Thwaites, 2015). For compensation, five items were used (e.g., I was offered an adequate 
monetary compensation by the company; α = .98). The mean values differed significantly 
across compensation levels, in the desired direction (M£150 = 4.99 > M£50 = 3.84 > MControl = 
2.19, F [2, 91] = 57.36, p < .001). For explanation, four items were used (e.g., The company 
explained what factors might have caused the problem; α = .97), with significant differences 
between the two conditions (MExplanation = 5.22 > MNo Explanation = 2.05, F [1, 92] = 112.33, p < 
.001). Four items were used for apology (e.g., The company apologized to me for what had 
happened.; α = .93), with significant differences between the mean values (MApology = 4.68 > 
MNo Apology = 2.61, F [1, 92] = 50.25, p < .001). Respondents perceived scenarios as realistic on 
a two-item seven-point scale (e.g., I believe that such incidents are likely to happen in real life; 
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α = .92), with the mean value greater than the scale midpoint (M = 5.29, t = 10.76, p < .001), 
which did not differ across groups (F = 1.17, p < .330). 
 
Direct effects of organizational tactics. Results of two ANCOVAs with the organizational 
tactic as the independent variable, nWOM/image as the dependent variable, and including the 
five controls show a significant effect of organizational tactic on nWOM (F = 22.78, p < .001, 
η² = .52) and corporate image (F = 21.66, p < .001, η² = .51). Among the control variables, 
service importance and attribution had significant effects on the DVs, although inclusion or 
exclusion of the controls did not significantly influence the results. 
Effect of compensation. Post-hoc tests3 reveal that nWOM is significantly lower in the high 
monetary compensation group than in the no response control group (MHigh compensation = 3.99 < 
MControl = 5.76, p < .001), while nWOM for low monetary compensation does not differ 
significantly from the control group (MLow compensation = 5.07, p < .057). Regarding corporate 
image, post-hoc comparisons indicate a higher image in the high monetary compensation 
group, compared to the control group (MHigh compensation = 4.90 > MControl = 2.57, p < .001), while 
image for low monetary compensation is as high as in the control group (MLow compensation = 2.77, 
p < .598).  
Effect of explanation. Post-hoc tests show a significantly lower nWOM level for explanation, 
compared to the control group (MExplanation = 3.22 < MControl = 5.76, p < .001). The former value 
is even significantly lower than in the high monetary compensation condition (MExplanation = 
3.22 < MHigh compensation = 3.99, p < .020). For image, post-hoc tests indicate significantly higher 
image levels in the explanation condition than in the control condition (MExplanation = 4.90 > 
                                                          
3 We used LSD as the default test, but other tests yielded similar results.   
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MControl = 2.57, p < .001), but the former value is not significantly higher than in the high 
monetary compensation condition (MExplanation = 4.90 > MHigh compensation = 4.49, p < .223). 
Effect of Apology. As expected, post-hoc tests indicate that apology does not significantly 
affect nWOM (M = 5.67, p = .785) or image (M = 2.62, p =.887), compared to the control 
group. Figure 2 depicts the results. 
 
Figure 2 To Be Inserted Here 
 
Test of H1 and H2. For a formal test of H1 and H2, a mediation analysis is conducted using the 
PROCESS tool and Model 4 (Hayes, 2013). We select organizational tactic with five categories 
as the independent variable, nWOM and image as the dependent variables, anger as the 
mediator, and include the five controls. Because the independent variable organizational tactic 
is multi-categorical, the first group (here: no response tactic) serves as a baseline, which is 
tested against the other groups (Hayes & Preacher, 2014), these being the single organizational 
tactics. 
High monetary compensation exerts a significant negative effect on anger (b = -1.47, t 
= -4.24, p < .001). Anger has a significant positive effect on nWOM (b = .61, t = 7.19, p < 
.001) and a significant negative effect on image (b = -.58, t = -6.18, p < .001). The indirect 
effects of high monetary compensation on nWOM (b = -.89, SE = .29, CI: -1.51 to -.38) and 
image (b = .84, SE = .29, CI: .34 to 1.49) through anger are significant, as indicated by the 
95%-confidence intervals excluding zero, supporting H1a and H1b. 
Explanation exerts a significant negative effect on anger (b = -2.17, t = -6.52, p < .001). 
Its indirect effects on nWOM (b = -1.32, SE = .26, CI: -1.84 to -.81) and image (b = 1.25, SE 
= .28, CI: .74 to 1.86) through anger are significant, supporting H2a and H2b. 
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Ruling out alternative models 
Although not specifically hypothesized, we also examine the role of injustice, which is 
presented as mediating the effects of organizational tactics on customers' behavioral reactions 
in prior research (Lepthien et al., 2017). Anger as the mediator in our framework is an emotion 
resulting from cognitive evaluations of an event's undesirability and other agency (Averill, 
1983). As such, injustice perceptions shaped by external attributions of an undesirable and 
controllable event caused by the firm on purpose (De Cremer et al., 2008; Watson & Spence, 
2007) may also precede anger (Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). Indeed, justice is an important 
aspect of people’s everyday lives (De Cremer et al., 2008) because it reassures them that they 
are a valued member of a society. An unfair treatment damages this perception and makes 
customers feel disrespected and excluded from the society, which in turn can harm their self-
identity and self-worth (Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Anger is shown to fully mediate the effect of 
(in)justice on misbehavior (Beijersbergen et al., 2015). Accordingly, in a termination context, 
anger is a strong negative emotional reaction that may embed injustice and act as the primary 
driver of customers’ subsequent reactions. In order to support this notion, we test an alternative 
model to show that when anger is present, injustice perception is no longer instrumental in 
explaining customers’ reactions to termination. 
Accordingly, we test a serial mediation model (using Hayes’ Process Model 6) where perceived 
justice (three items taken from Smith et al. (1999), α = .94) precedes anger in explaining the 
effects of organizational tactics on nWOM and image, respectively (tactics  justice  anger 
 DVs).  
The results of serial mediation are similar to the results using anger as the sole mediator 
(tactics  anger  DVs) and the explanatory power of the model for anger alone is the same 
as the justice-anger serial link model, but higher than justice alone model for both nWOM (R 
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square of .73 rather than .61) and image (R square of .71 rather than .63). Regarding nWOM, 
the results show significant indirect effects of high monetary compensation (b = -.31, SE = .11, 
CI: -.55 to -.10) and explanation (b = -.47, SE = .15, CI: -.80 to -.20) for the serial mediation 
link "tactics  justice  anger  nWOM". The corresponding indirect effects through anger 
only (tactics  anger  nWOM) are also significant and of a similar size (high monetary 
compensation: b = -.31, SE = .17, CI: -.70 to -.02; explanation: b = -.45, SE = .20, CI: -.88 to -
.09), whereas the indirect effects through perceived justice "tactics  justice  nWOM" are 
non-significant (high monetary compensation: b = -.04, SE = .09, CI: -.23 to .14; explanation: 
b = -.06, SE = .14, CI: -.34 to .20). 
Results for image show significant indirect effects of high monetary compensation (b 
= .25, SE = .11, CI: .07 to .52) and explanation (b = .38, SE = .16, CI: .14 to .76) through the 
justice-anger link, significant and similar indirect effects through anger (monetary 
compensation: b = .25, SE = .14, CI: .02 to .58; explanation: b = .36, SE = .17, CI: .07 to .73), 
but non-significant indirect effects through justice (monetary compensation: b = .14, SE = .14, 
CI: -.14 to .43; explanation: b = .22, SE = .20, CI: -.23 to .57).  
 
Discussion 
Study 1 findings show that high (but not low) monetary compensation and explanation improve 
customers’ reactions to service termination. Counter to the popular belief (e.g., Davidow, 
2003), explanation is more effective than (high) monetary compensation. As expected, an 
apology, is not effective in a service termination context. It does not seem to be considered as 
sincere, because terminating a customer account is an intentional act. Hence, apology is 
excluded from further examinations. Importantly, and in support of our H1a, b and H2a, b, the 
results show a mediating role of anger on the effects of high monetary compensation and 
explanation on nWOM and image. Finally, the results of our competing model analyses show 
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that in a termination context, the effect of justice is diminishing when including anger and that 
anger, rather than justice, plays a primary role in driving customers’ reactions. Therefore, we 
only use anger as the mediator in the subsequent studies.     
 
Study 2a 
Purpose  
Study 2a tests robustness for Study 1 results for monetary compensation in another sector 
(banking rather than telecom) and another sample (consumers rather than students). 
Importantly, it tests termination strategy (hard vs. soft) as a moderator on the process at work 
(H3).  
 
Design and data collection 
We conducted a scenario-based experiment with a 2 (service termination strategy: hard vs. soft) 
by 3 (monetary compensation: no vs. low vs. high) between-subject design, yielding six 
conditions. The baseline scenario described the closure of a credit card account as this type of 
service termination occurred most often in the consumer complaints regarding the closure of 
bank accounts reported to the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2016).  
Participants were recruited through Critical Mix, which is an online panel with US adult 
consumers. They were invited by posting the invitation to participate in this online experiment 
on the panel platform in exchange for a small compensation. We obtained a sample of 220 
completed questionnaires (male: 52.3%, younger than 45 years: 44.1%, married: 50.0%, at least 
a college degree: 63.6%). We randomly assigned respondents to the six groups.  
 
Manipulations 
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To keep a balance between control and ecological validity, we used video clips comprised of 
photographs and audio recordings (Bateson & Hui, 1992). In the video clip, we showed some 
photos including a letter marked urgent and a fictitious termination letter that displayed the text 
related to the manipulation of termination strategy while a narrator read out the core scenario. 
The stimuli included in the letter stated that following a recent review of the account, the bank 
withdraws its services and is giving 60 days' notice of intention to close the credit card account.  
Service termination strategy was manipulated as follows: For the hard approach, the 
customer is required to make alternative arrangements at another financial institution and pay 
off or transfer any outstanding balance by the end of the 60-day period. For the soft approach, 
the bank appreciates this may cause inconvenience and will make the transition smooth by 
offering help to move to another provider. Next, the customer contacts the bank's customer 
service team to complain and is or is not offered monetary compensation (see Online Appendix 
A 4. for scenarios).  
Monetary compensation levels were determined based on two pretests with subjects 
similar to the main study recruited from a US consumer panel. In the first pretest (n=55), the 
average amount of monetary compensation expected following a bank account closure was 
identified (i.e., M= $150). Similar to Study 1, we selected $50 below or above the average 
expected amount as low (i.e., $100) and high (i.e., $200) monetary compensation. In a 
subsequent pretest (n=71), we checked the manipulation of these levels using five items similar 
to Study 1 on a 7-point scale. The mean values differed significantly across different 
compensation levels, in the desired direction (M$200 = 5.04 > M$100 = 3.92 > MControl = 2.11, F 
[2, 68] = 40.76, p < .001).  
 
Measures 
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The dependent variables were the same nWOM (α = .91), image (α = .96), and anger (α = .94) 
measures as in Study 1. We included the same controls: ATC (α = .87), severity (α = .89), 
attributions (α = .68), service importance, and gender. Attribution failed to achieve the .7 
threshold for internal consistency, so we only retained one item (see Table A 2. in the Online 
Appendix). Given that Study 2a used consumers, we also added age as an additional control.  
 
Results 
Manipulation checks. The termination strategy manipulation was checked through a pretest 
(Perdue & Summers, 1986), with 58 subjects similar to the main study recruited from a US 
consumer panel. The measure comprised four self-developed items (e.g., The bank showed 
interest in facilitating my transition to another bank; α = .92). Its mean value differed 
significantly across strategies, in the desired direction (MHard = 2.79; MSoft = 4.27, F [1, 56] = 
14.59, p < .001).  
Following an attention check in the main study (n = 220), 91%, 95%, and 93% of 
respondents correctly identified whether they received no money, $100, or $200 respectively. 
Removing the 16 cases with incorrect answers yielded a net sample of n = 204. These 
respondents perceived the scenarios as realistic (same two items as in Study 1; α = .93), with 
the mean value significantly higher than the scale midpoint (M = 5.16, t = 11.71, p < .001) and 
did not differ across groups (F = 1.09, p < .366). Hence, the manipulations were successful. 
 
Overview. Hypotheses are tested conducting a moderated mediation analysis using the 
PROCESS tool and Model 8 (Hayes, 2013) with a multi-categorical independent variable 
(Hayes & Preacher, 2014), testing the baseline group (no monetary compensation) against the 
other groups (high and low monetary compensation).   
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Test of H3a. H3a refers to whether strategy type moderates the effect of high (but no low) 
monetary compensation through anger on nWOM. Table 1, Panel A (left side) depicts the 
results for high monetary compensation, indicating a significant positive index of moderated 
mediation (b = .45, SE = .23, CI: .01 to .91). Results indicate a significant negative indirect 
effect of high monetary compensation on nWOM through anger for a hard termination (b = -
.46, SE = .15, CI: -.78 to -.18), but not for a soft termination (b = -.02, SE = .16, CI: -.33 to 
.30). These results support H3a. Table 1, Panel A (right side) depicts the results for low 
monetary compensation, indicating the expected null effect. There is no significant index of 
moderated mediation (b = .29, SE = .23, CI: -.15 to .75), with non-significant indirect effects 
both for hard and soft termination.  
  
Test of H3b. H3b refers to whether strategy type moderates the effect of monetary 
compensation through anger on image. Table 1, Panel B (left side) depicts the results for high 
monetary compensation, indicating a significant negative index of moderated mediation (b = -
.45, SE = .22, CI: -.89 to -.01). The indirect effect of high monetary compensation on image 
through anger is significant and positive for a hard termination strategy (b = .45, SE = .15, CI: 
.17 to .75), but non-significant for a soft strategy (b = -.02, SE = .16, CI: -.29 to .34). These 
results support H3b. Table 1, Panel B (right side) depicts the results for low monetary 
compensation, indicating a null effect. There is no significant index of moderated mediation (b 
= -.28, SE = .22, CI: -.72 to .14), with non-significant indirect effects both for the hard and soft 
termination strategy.  
 
Table 1 To Be Inserted Here 
 
Discussion 
 24 
Study 2a validates Study 1 findings for high monetary compensation with another sample 
(consumers) and industry (banking): High, but not low, monetary compensation decreases 
nWOM and increases corporate image, through reducing anger. Importantly, Study 2a results 
provide evidence of a conditional processing. High monetary compensation only reduces anger 
and subsequent nWOM in case of a hard termination strategy, but not in case of a soft strategy. 
The same mechanism applies to corporate image, which is only increased through anger 
reduction in case of a hard, not a soft, termination approach. Results indicate termination 
strategy as a boundary condition: it is ineffective to invest monetary resources on terminated 
customers if the firm offers to help them find another provider.  
 
 
Study 2b 
Purpose  
Study 2b focuses on explanation as the most effective organizational tactic according to Study 
1 findings (telecom sector and students). Again, one purpose of Study 2b is to check the 
robustness of this finding in another context (banking sector and consumers). The main purpose 
is to test termination strategy (hard vs. soft) as a moderator (H4) on the process "explanation 
 anger  nWOM, image”. Finally, we include a no termination condition and test if an 
explanation can put customers on par with a no termination situation, that is, whether nWOM 
and image reach levels as if the customers were not dismissed.  
 
Design and data collection 
We conducted a scenario-based experiment with a 2 (service termination strategy: hard vs. soft) 
by 2 (explanation: absent vs. present) between-subject design, yielding four conditions. The 
baseline scenario described the closure of a bank account (see Online Appendix A 5. for 
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scenarios). We also added another group where no termination occurs but the bank 
communicates neutral information as follows: "Because of the competitive nature of the 
market, we have decided to review our service offerings. This is in line with the industry norms 
and current evaluations of the services offered by other banks. We will communicate any 
changes in due course." 
Participants were US adult consumers recruited through an online panel, Clickworker, 
in exchange for a small compensation. The 180 participants who completed the questionnaire 
were randomly assigned to the conditions (female: 62.8%, younger than 35 years: 46.1%, 
married: 44.4%, at least a college degree: 58.9%).  
 
 
Manipulations 
Again, we used video clips and manipulated termination strategy similar to Study 2a. 
Explanation was manipulated as follows: "Our records indicate that you have been excessively 
withdrawing money from the non-network ATMs, which is imposing additional charge on us. 
And while we have clearly explained in the terms and conditions our fair usage policy as a key 
requirement of our fee-free withdrawal facility, the number of withdrawals you have made 
during this time has led us to believe that we are unable to meet your current banking needs."  
 
Measures 
Like in Study 2a, the dependent variables were nWOM (α = .95), image (α = .98), and anger 
(α = .95), and we included the same controls: attitude towards complaining (ATC) (α = .87), 
severity (α = .92), service importance, attributions (α = .85), as well as gender and age.  
  
Results 
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Manipulation check. As an attention check, respondents were asked whether the bank wanted 
to close their account. 94% and 96% of participants correctly responded to the check in the no 
termination (i.e., understood that their account would not be closed) and termination conditions 
(i.e., understood that their account would be closed), respectively. Eight respondents with 
incorrect answers were excluded. The manipulation of explanation was checked with four items 
from Mostafa et al. (2015) using a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., The bank explained why the 
problem has happened; α = .97). The mean of the explanation condition was significantly 
higher than the no explanation condition (MExplanation = 5.70 > MNo Explanation = 1.54, p < .001). 
Respondents perceived the scenarios as realistic (same two items as in previous studies; α = 
.91), with the mean values significantly higher than the scale midpoint (M = 5.65, t = 21.68, p 
< .001) and no differences across groups (F = 1.49, p = .21). Hence, the manipulations were 
successful. 
 
ANCOVA results for effects of termination. We first compare the experimental groups with 
termination conditions against the no termination condition, using two ANCOVAs for nWOM 
and image. All analyses include the six control variables. Results show a significant effect of 
termination on nWOM (F = 12.16, p < .001, η² = .23) and image (F = 15.27, p < .001, η² = .28). 
For nWOM, post-hoc tests reveal that compared to the no termination group (M = 3.68), 
service termination without an explanation significantly increases nWOM, both in the hard (M 
= 5.64, p < .001) and soft strategy conditions (M = 4.53, p < .05). Importantly, explanation 
reduces nWOM to a level that does not differ significantly from the no termination group, both 
in the hard (M = 3.78, p = .80) and soft strategy conditions (M = 3.40, p = .44). 
For image, post-hoc tests show that compared to the no termination group (M = 4.13), 
service termination without an explanation significantly reduces image in both hard termination 
(M = 1.90, p < .001) and soft termination (M = 3.09, p < .01). Further, explanation improves 
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image to an extent that is not significantly different from the no termination group, both in the 
hard (4.08, p = 89) and soft termination (4.25, p = .74) conditions. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
We excluded the no termination group (n=34) and tested hypotheses using the PROCESS 
Model 8 (Hayes, 2013), by comparing the no explanation group with the explanation group.  
 
Test of H4a. H4a refers to whether the effect of explanation through anger on nWOM is 
moderated by strategy type. Results (see Table 2) show a significant negative indirect effect of 
explanation on nWOM through anger for both a hard (b = -1.48, SE = .26, CI: -2.02 to -.99) 
and soft termination (b = -.93, SE = .27, CI: -1.48 to -.42), but there is no significant difference 
between the two based on the index of moderated mediation (b = .55, SE = .35, CI: -.16 to 
1.26). Therefore, H4a is not supported.  
 
Test of H4b. H4b refers to whether strategy type moderates the effect of explanation through 
anger on corporate image. Results indicate that the indirect effect of explanation on image 
through anger is significant and positive for both a hard (b = 1.48, SE = .28, CI: .96 to 2.06) 
and soft termination (b = .93, SE = .27, CI: .41 to 1.47). However, the index of moderated 
mediation does not show any significant difference between the two termination strategies (b 
= -.55, SE = .36, CI: -1.28 to .12). Hence, H4b is not supported.  
 
Table 2 To Be Inserted Here 
 
Discussion 
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Study 2b reveals that service termination (both hard and soft strategy) significantly increases 
nWOM and reduces image compared with a no termination condition, but offering explanation 
can offset these negative consequences and put customers' nWOM, image, and anger levels on 
par with a no service termination situation. Additionally, Study 2b validates Study 1 findings 
for explanation with another sample (consumers) and industry (banking): Following both hard 
and soft termination, explanation is effective in decreasing nWOM and increasing corporate 
image, through reducing anger levels. However, there is no significant difference between the 
two termination strategies with regards to the indirect effects of explanation on nWOM and 
image. Hence, unlike monetary compensation, offering an explanation is always an effective 
firm tactic to influence customers’ reactions in service termination. 
 
General discussion and theoretical implications 
Previous studies have shown that termination of customer relationships triggers customers’ 
anger and nWOM (Mittal et al., 2008), damages firm’s image (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000), and 
reduces other existing customers’ loyalty intentions and prospective customers’ desire to join 
the company (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2010). Yet, only Lepthien et al. (2017) address the 
effectiveness of monetary compensation and downgrading the customer following contract 
termination among affected customers. But to the best of our knowledge, no research has 
analyzed the effectiveness of explanation as a form of psychological compensation, nor has it 
examined the interaction between organizational tactics and termination strategies to reduce 
the negative consequences of a service termination. In addition, our knowledge of the 
mechanism that drives the effectiveness of organizational tactics to service termination is 
limited. Therefore, this paper makes important contributions to the service termination 
literature by examining the effectiveness of different organizational tactics and unveiling their 
boundary conditions.  
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Effectiveness of monetary compensation and boundary condition. Only high (but not low) 
monetary compensation can reduce the undesirability of service termination through mitigating 
customers’ anger, which subsequently reduces nWOM and increases image perceptions. This 
finding challenges the notion that offering some monetary compensation is better than none 
(Davidow, 2003; Gelbrich, Gäthke, & Grégoire, 2016). We also address the call for research 
by Grewal et al. (2008) in determining the limitations of monetary compensation as a seemingly 
powerful organizational tactic and as a key remedy for service termination (Lepthien et al., 
2017). As a core contribution above Lepthien et al. (2017), we show that high monetary 
compensation is only effective with a hard termination, but it is rendered unnecessary with a 
soft approach, when firms help customers move to an alternative provider. This finding is 
important as it can be directly influenced by the firm.  
 
Effectiveness of explanation and boundary condition. Our most important contribution is 
examining the effectiveness of explanation. We show that this organizational tactic can reduce 
firm-agency by shifting the responsibility away from the firm, and it is even more powerful 
than monetary redress, at least with respect to nWOM. We also demonstrate that its effect is 
independent of the termination strategy, while monetary compensation only works with hard 
termination. Interestingly, offering an explanation can fully offset the negative consequences 
of termination and put customers' nWOM, image, and anger levels on par with a no service 
termination situation. These findings oppose common knowledge on the effectiveness of 
different organizational tactics following firms’ transgressions. Prior research shows that 
monetary compensation is the most important remedy (Orsingher, Valentini, & de Angelis, 
2010) and explanation is, at best, "an adequate substitute" (Gelbrich, 2010, p. 580). This is 
important because explanation is a cost-free alternative to monetary compensation. 
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Further, apology, which is considered the core tool for psychological redress in the 
service failure literature, does not help with an intentional act like customer dismissal. This is 
consisetent with the finding of Roschk and Kaiser (2013) showing the importance of perceived 
sincerity of an apology in order to be effective. Deliberately rejecting a customer and—in the 
same breath—apologizing for this intentional act can be perceived as insincere.  
 
Mediating role of anger. Another contribution is shedding light on the mechanism that drives 
customers’ reactions to service termination and organizational tactics. We address the call for 
research by Haenlein and Kaplan (2012) on the role of customers’ emotional reactions to 
termination. We draw on cognitive appraisal theory to show how firm-initiated service 
termination as an undesirable, controllable, and intentional act (i.e., clear firm-attribution) can 
elicit anger (Watson & Spence, 2007) and subsequently trigger negative behavioral reactions 
(Frijda et al., 1989). Previously, Lepthien et al. (2017) adopted justice as the anchor to explain 
customers’ reactions to service termination. However, our study enhances our understanding 
of service termination by demonstrating the diminishing effects of justice and a key role that 
anger plays in explaining the effectiveness of organizational tactics on customers’ reactions to 
service termination. This is because, unlike justice, anger captures the firm-agency comprising 
controllability and intentionality entailed in service termination. Accordingly, anger is 
considered to be the primary predictor of negative behavioral reactions, thus relativizing the 
role of justice (Beijersbergen et al., 2015), particularly in a termination context.  
 
Managerial implications 
We provide managerial recommendations on how to reduce the negative consequences 
of service termination. As a top priority, managers should explain why they terminated the 
relationship. Offering a truthful explanation, regardless of the termination strategy, can diffuse 
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customers’ anger through helping them see the problem from the firm's perspective and re-
evaluating their blame attribution. In fact, a good explanation can fully eliminate customers' 
negative reactions to termination. Yet, this is in sharp contrast with firms' current practices, 
according to customer complaints filed with the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB, 2016), which is referring customers to the terms and conditions (i.e., stating that firms 
have the right to unilaterally end the relationship) or refusing to provide any information at all 
(e.g., by redirecting customers' calls to an automated voice mail).  
These practices seem to further fuel customers’ negative emotions. Given that anger 
plays a major role in driving customers’ reactions to termination, service managers can be more 
creative and use different tactics to manage customer anger. For example, service termination 
often comes as a shock (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2010), but Mittal et al. (2008) suggest that prior 
warning may reduce customers’ negative reactions. This is because, advance warning may 
partly shift the blame from the firm, by passing more responsibility for the situation to 
customers, which can ultimatey reduce anger. In addition, it is important to provide training 
for service employees to ensure they acquire the skills needed when dealing with angry 
customers (Bougie et al. , 2003). Particularly, acknowleding terminated customers’ anger 
before responding to their complaints may already reduce blamefulness before implementing 
any other tactic. Employees could, for example, use empathetic words such as "I understand 
that this may come as a disappointment, but let me explain why we believe another provider 
may be more suitable for you." 
Although providing an explanation for service termination is the most desirable tactic, 
some firms may refrain from offering an explanation in fear of being sued due to discriminatory 
behavior (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2009). Here, in lieu of explanation, [high] monetary 
compensation (as the next best tactic) can help reduce the damages caused by a hard 
termination. In this regard, it is crucial for managers to know how much remuneration should 
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be offered to dismissed customers. This study offers an initial indication of low (£50/$100) and 
high (£150/$200) level of monetary compensation following service termination based on two 
different industries and countries. We propose that firms should follow an "all-or-nothing" 
approach for financial remuneration, and termination strategy plays a key role here. Firms that 
follow a hard strategy need to provide high financial redress to compensate for the economic 
loss comprised in service termination ("all"). In contrast, firms following a soft strategy, which 
is helping customers with a smooth transition to another provider, should not offer any 
monetary remuneration ("nothing").  
Our reseach also allows recommendations on when to choose the hard termination with 
high compensation or soft termination with no compensation approach. The former strategy 
should be chosen by firms lacking the willingness, ability, or capacity to help customers find 
an alternative provider. This hard approach may comprise low effort at first glance, but leads 
to higher negative consequences which requires a high monetary compensation. Hence, firms 
are well advised to pursue a soft approach if they have a profound market knowledge along 
with a good network and thus, are able to find alternative providers at low search costs. 
Alternative providers could be subsidiaries, strategic partners in a network (Mittal et al., 2008), 
or even competing firms with business models that are more appropriate for their dismissed 
customers (Rosenblum, Tomlinson, & Scott, 2003). In choosing a soft termination strategy, 
firms can "kill two birds with one stone": save money that is otherwise needed for 
compensation and reduce the negative consequences of service termination.  
Ultimately, there is a general trade-off for firms how to spend their resources to 
minimize the negative consequences of termination. Firms can either offer monetary 
compensation to terminated customers (to reduce nWOM and improve image) or alternatively 
avoid paying financial compensation to affected customers (risking nWOM and lower sales), 
but rather offer reduced prices or better quality to attract potential customers. Our research 
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helps settle this trade-off by showing that firms can save the costs of monetary compensation 
either through explaining the reason for termination or helping customers move to an 
alternative provider. However, if firms refrain from an explanation or a soft termination (e.g., 
for strategic reasons), they may need to invest money into compensation for affected customers, 
rather than into price reductions for customer acquistion. This is because the nWOM from the 
affected customers can spread through social media, making it easier than ever for the public 
and potential customers to find out about firm's transgressions (such as customer termination). 
According to Haenlein and Kaplan (2010), when potential customers find out about such 
practices, price reductions to attract these potential customers are ineffective. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Some limitations of our studies provide opportunities for future research. First, we have an 
initial indication of the low and high level of compensation for service termination. However, 
these values may be country- and context-specific. Therefore, it is important to replicate the 
studies in different countries and industries. Second, given that many customers often have 
more than one service with a financial institution (e.g., current account, savings account, and 
home insurance), future research can investigate whether termination of one service offering 
can lead  customers’ to voluntary switching to other providers (i.e., cutting all ties with that 
firm). Third, one could examine customers’ reactions to different reasons for termination (e.g., 
customer misbehaviour vs. lack of profitability or firms aiming to maximize profit). Finally, in 
our experiments, the termination and explanation scenarios were aimed at individuals rather 
than a group of customers and the explanation which was offered to the individual proved to 
be effective. But, future researchers should examine the moderating effect of the size of 
termination (i.e., single vs. group termination) as suggested by Albrecht, Walsh, and Beatty 
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(2016) and the effectiveness of using different communication styles (e.g., one to one vs. one 
to many communication) as suggested by Vaerenbergh, Larivière, and Vermeir (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
Anger 
nWOM 
Corporate Image 
H1 
Organizational 
Tactics 
Customers’ 
Reactions 
Termination 
Strategy 
(Soft = 0 vs Hard = 1) 
H2 
H3 (+) 
Monetary Compensation 
(No = 0, Low = 1, High = 2) 
Explanation  
(No = 0, Yes = 1) 
H4 (+) 
a (-) 
b (+) 
 35 
  
 
Figure 2. Mean values of nWOM and image for experimental groups (Study 1).  
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Table 1. Results of moderated mediation analysis (Study 2a). 
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Table 2. Results of moderated mediation analysis (Study 2b). 
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